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ABSTRACT: Virtue epistemology (VE) was modeled on virtue ethics theories to transfer their ethical 
insights to epistemology. VE has had great success: broadening our perspective, providing new answers to 
traditional questions, and raising exciting new questions. I offer a new argument for VE based on the 
concept of cognitive achievements, a broader notion than purely epistemic achievements. The argument is 
then extended to cognitive transformations, especially the cognitive transformations brought about by 
argumentation. 
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1. PROLOGUE. 
 
Virtue epistemology (VE) was consciously modeled on virtue ethics theories with the 
hope that some of their conceptual breakthroughs and achievements in ethics might be re-
created in epistemology. The results exceeded expectations: virtue epistemologies are 
flourishing, having already made significant contributions to the discourse of 
epistemology. The change in perspective turned out to be a broader perspective, with 
good effect not only for answering traditional epistemological questions, but also for 
determining which questions to put on the agenda and for understanding how they relate 
to one another. 
My contention is that a similar turn in argumentation theory could well have 
similar results. The overall orientation is agent-based: a good argument is one that has 
been conducted virtuously. But what exactly does that mean? It has to take all the roles 
that agents play in argumentation into account. As a result, it will be a broader 
perspective, capable of bringing disparate parts of the field into a larger whole and re-
shaping the disciplinary agenda. I believe this kind of re-orientation can help answer a 
cluster of outstanding questions for argumentation theorists: when, with whom, about 
what, and, above all, why should we argue. And, as a corollary but of no less importance, 
it can help us answer when, with whom, about what, and why we should not argue. 
Above all, a virtue epistemology approach to argumentation theory preserves the 
insights motivating traditional epistemological approaches to argument while losing its 
distorting obsession with justified true belief as the Holy Grail of epistemology and of 
argumentation alike. 
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2. SOME VIRTUES OF VIRTUE EPISTEMOLOGY 
 
One of the great virtues of virtue ethics approaches is that they are better situated than 
their consequentialist and deontological counterparts to recognize, accommodate, and 
appreciate ethical but non-moral values without flattening them into moral values. Virtue 
ethics focuses broadly on agents and their lives, rather than narrowly on just their actions, 
just their motives, or just governing principles. The wider perspective is liberating. 
Family and friendship, for example, are immediately recognizable as ethically, if not 
morally, important goods insofar as they contribute to the quality and value of a life. This 
simply recognizes that it is valuable, it is good, to be part of strong networks of family 
and friends, without having to regard someone who lacks those ties as morally 
blameworthy on that account. It is ethically good but not morally obligatory to have 
friends. (Of course, if one does have friends, then the moral judgment that one is, or is 
not, a good friend is a separate matter.) The focus of ethics changes from what to do to 
what to be and how to be. 
 Although apparently not by design, something similar can be said on behalf of the 
virtue epistemologies that appeared following the efforts of Ernest Sosa (1980), and later, 
Linda Zagzebski (1996, 2000, 2001) John Greco (1999), among others. The movement 
was initially motivated by very traditional epistemological questions. The idea was that a 
change in focus from beliefs to believers could provide the resources to withstand Gettier 
problems and skeptical arguments. They also hoped to circumvent the debates between 
foundationalists and coherentists, and between internalists and externalists. If history is 
any guide, the effect of this re-orientation on the disciplinary agenda will almost certainly 
not be neutral. After all, virtue epistemology is perfectly situated to recognize, 
accommodate, and appreciate cognitive but non-epistemic values without having to 
flatten them into the standard epistemological categories.1
This last point deserves to be emphasized because it provides the starting point for 
what I think is an original and compelling reason to favor VE approaches. Traditional 
epistemologies ostensibly direct their attention to the general concept of justification, but 
what really attracts their attention is a much narrower concept: the justification of beliefs. 
What about all the other propositional attitudes we take, including doubt, consideration, 
and supposing? They are all things that can be justified. Can we simply assume that these 
get the same kind of justification that justifies our justified beliefs? 
Consider doubt, a case that presents a great contrast. If, as many claim, some 
beliefs come with a presumption in their favor, either because they are innate or given or 
somehow privileged, then for those beliefs, it is doubt rather than belief that would need 
justification.2 Believing is not just something we can decide to do – but neither is 
                                                          
1 Rescher 1988 uses “cognitive” for the propositional attitudes most closely allied with belief and factual 
propositions, as distinct from practical and evaluative cognitions. Pinto 2003c preserves the distinction, 
using the term “doxastic” to refer to the most belief-like states, with “cognitive” pressed into duty as a 
broader category – but still propositional. I am using it in a still broader sense so that it would apply even to 
mental states, if any, that are not reducible to attitudes towards discreet propositions. 
2 Many philosophers have nominated certain classes of beliefs as having primitive or initial (i.e., non-
derivative) justification. Perforce, this includes all foundationalists. Some of them do address the question 
of differential justifications for different beliefs directly, but few take on the issue of different kinds of 
justification for different propositional attitudes. Harman 1984 gets close when he considers “squatters’ 
rights” for our current beliefs, and thus different criteria for belief acquisition and belief retention. 
2 
VIRTUE EPISTEMOLOGY AND ARGUMENTATION THEORY 
doubting! Descartes understood this. We have to have at least some grounds for doubt, 
even if it is just a manufactured and fanciful story about an Evil Demon. Now let me ask 
this: Is the justification needed for doubt the same kind of justification we use for belief?3 
We may, in the end, conclude that “justification” really is used univocally for when 
talking about doubt and belief, but that is a pretty substantial thesis. It deserves its own 
justification.  
As an aside, let me suggest that carefully distinguishing these differences in 
justification, especially the justification for doubt, is one way to put the brakes on 
philosophy’s methodological bias towards skepticism. Everything may be arguable, but 
being doubtable is another matter.4
Things get more complicated when we consider cognitive states that are not 
discretely propositional. Can’t they be justified? Values, for example, may be justified or 
unjustified; so can attitudes; but neither is easily cashed out in terms of individual 
propositions and distinct propositional attitudes. Virtue epistemology brings this question 
into squarely into focus.  And it is a good question. After all, epistemological agents do 
more than simply believe or disbelieve true-or-false propositions, with varying degrees of 
commitment and justification.5 Regardless of whether the study of epistemology is 
supposed to make us better epistemological agents, it ought to help us understand what it 
is to be a better epistemological agent. For that, it needs to consider everything that good 
epistemological agents do. 
There are many cognitive achievements for epistemological consideration in 
addition to knowledge and justified belief. Wisdom and understanding, for example, are 
not exotic species of knowledge.6 There are many different cognitive abilities leading to 
those achievements that are not reducible to acquired propositional knowledge. If 
Aristotle was right, then the ability to craft good new metaphors, that un-teachable sign of 
genius, is one example. We could add the ability to interpret difficult literary texts 
elegantly, the ability to identify different species of sparrows by their songs alone, the 
ability to master a second language, and even the knack for saying just the right thing in 
difficult social situations. (See Gardner 1993 on “interpersonal intelligence.”) These are 
                                                          
3 Kavka’s “Toxin Puzzle” raises the possibility that having some justification may actually be a necessary 
prerequisite for forming an intention. If so, then the situation with respect to justifying intention, as a 
propositional attitude, would be markedly different from belief, as it is understood by traditional 
epistemologists. Kavka 1983. 
4 Apart from its role in permitting skepticism, the fact that we can argue about things we might not actually 
be able to doubt is an important datum about argumentation. Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca 1969, p. 479 
disagree, drawing a connection between an individual’s doubt and group dissensus: “All argumentation is 
indicative of a doubt, for it assumes the advisability of strengthening, or of making more explicit, 
agreement on a given opinion. 
5 Quine and Ullian 1978 explicitly connect being rationality with coordinating the strength of one’s beliefs 
with the strength of the available evidence (although one might have supposed that  a Pragmatist would 
have preferred to use “reasons” rather than “evidence” in that formula). See also Goldman 1988, pp 88-93, 
on “evidence proportionalism” and Pinto 2005 (and, better, the longer version, Pinto forthcoming) for a 
more nuanced qualitative version. 
6 The difference understanding and knowledge is often treated as a commonplace –Lipton 2004, for 
example, refers to the “gap between knowledge and understanding” as the first, uncontroversial feature of 
explanation – but identifying this with the possibility of knowing-p (i.e., knowing that p is the case) without 
understanding-p (i.e., understanding why p is the case) misses the issue here because this could be 
explained as differences in what is known. There are different senses of “understanding.” Kvanvig 2003 
carefully identifies the difference in kind between some uses of “understands” and knowledge. 
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all significant cognitive abilities, and acquiring any of them is a significant cognitive 
achievement. (See Kvanvig 2003, ch. 8, Cohen 2006, and Lusk 2006). And yet, 
traditional epistemologies have nothing to say about any of these unless the cognitive 
states can be cashed out in terms of the canonical, propositional attitude knowing-that-p. 
We need to broaden the range of epistemological concern to include not only such 
cognitive achievements as understanding-that-p but also such non-propositional, 
“objectual” attitudes as knowing-p, recognizing-p, and understanding-p. Non-epistemic 
cognitive abilities and achievements like know-how should not be ignored. 
There is more of interest for epistemologists in the realm of cognitive science than 
just the AI section. I am suggesting we broaden the focus of epistemology from what to 
think to what kind of thinker to be. This is where virtue epistemologies trump traditional 
versions because their entire orientation starts with virtues, i.e., the conditions that are 
conducive to the desired ends. When put that way, nothing in its framework restricts the 
desired ends to knowledge and justified belief. 
Let me illustrate this. Open-mindedness, or something like it, is a common entry 
in lists of the features that critical thinkers should have.7 Is it a cognitive virtue? I would 
expect most of us would like to think so, but we come up short when pressed to justify 
that claim. Traditional epistemologies can count it as a virtue only if it contributes to 
justifying our beliefs and is thus knowledge-conducive because that is the only value on 
record. Well, is it generally conducive to knowledge? That is an empirical question. 
Sometimes, of course, it does help to keep an open mind, so that the truth is not closed 
out. But for someone already in possession of true justified beliefs, it would be counter-
productive. It would serve only to re-open questions that are better off closed, putting 
perfectly good beliefs unnecessarily at risk. In that case, close-mindedness would serve 
better because what it would close out is error! (Cohen 2007) The same argument applies 
to the nearby virtue of being critically reflective. Someone with a knack for getting things 
right on first pass – the kind of intuitive person Malcolm Gladwell has in mind in Blink, 
and thinks we all are (Gladwell 2005) – would actually be better served by not reflecting 
on her beliefs. There are two problems here. First, there is the daunting empirical 
questions as to how often open-mindedness and being reflective are helpful in the 
production of knowledge, Second, after that, there is a messy conceptual question: How 
much of the time do they have to be helpful in order to count as a virtue? Some? All? 
Most?  
Don’t get me wrong. I do think open-mindedness is a virtue of the mind. In fact, I 
would still count it as a virtue even if it turned out to be generally detrimental to the 
production of knowledge! Isn’t that a contradiction? How can something that, perhaps 
more often than not, is an obstacle to knowledge still be counted as an important virtue? 
The paradox dissolves with the recognition that the category of cognitive virtues includes 
more than just the epistemic virtues. There is more to our cognitive lives than knowing. 
William James was on the right track: our concern is with more than just avoiding false 
propositions; we also need to be concern ourselves with believing true ones. But James 
still had his own blinders on: there are more cognitive achievements than justification and 
                                                          
7 Actually, the status of open-mindedness as a virtue is usually implicit: texts on critical thinking 
traditionally focus on what could be called “sins” and “vices” – fallacies of reasoning and factors that make 
our thinking uncritical – rather than the positive virtues.  Close-mindedness (or dogmatism or prejudice) is 
offered as an uncritical distorter, needing something like a principle of interpretive charity as a 
counterbalance. 
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knowledge, and there are more cognitive failings than ignorance and error. We do want 
knowledge of the world, of course, but we also want to understand it. That includes, 
prominently, understanding the other people who share the world with us. We want well-
informed attitudes and well-grounded values. We want to be able to recognize and 
appreciate both Raphael’s compelling perspectives as well as Pollock’s challenging 
vision, Schumann’s harmonies as well as Schönberg’s dissonance. We want to get Ted 
Cohen’s jokes, even (especially!) his really bad ones. For these projects, open-
mindedness is indeed a virtue. 
 
3. COGNITIVE ACHIEVEMENTS AND COGNITIVE TRANSFORMATIONS. 
 
Cognitive achievements don’t just happen, of course. They are the end result of all sorts 
of events and processes. Some of those transforming events and processes are cognitive; 
some are non-cognitive. The habits of mind that qualify as virtues are valuable because of 
the contributions they make to the cognitive processes that culminate in our cognitive 
achievements. This is where virtue epistemology becomes especially relevant for 
argumentation theory because arguments and argumentation occupy privileged positions 
among the events and processes that lead to important cognitive achievements. Arguers’ 
virtues are cognitive virtues. 
Some cognitive changes are best explained by causes that are irrelevant to the 
central subjects of argumentation theory. Becoming aware of one’s environment through 
perception – and becoming unaware of it by falling asleep – are pretty dramatic short-
term cognitive changes, but neither one typically counts as much of an accomplishment. 
Characteristically, neither results from argumentation. Our concern is with cognitive 
transformations, especially long-term ones, both positive and negative, that do result from 
argumentation, and of the positive ones, those that do represent significant 
accomplishments. This is at the heart of what argumentation at its best is all about. 
Here is an example of a positive cognitive achievement that does not come about 
by argument: developing the ability to distinguish teal blue from cerulean blue. That skill 
is better achieved through painstaking practice and training than deliberation or rational 
discussion. To varying degrees, the same could be said about being able to distinguish 
between a merlot and a pinot noir by smell alone, a piece by Sonny Rollins and one by 
John Coltrane at first hearing, a painting by Rembrandt from a painting by one of his 
pupils at first sight, or a poem by Adrienne Rich from one by Maya Angelou at first 
reading. These are all things that we could learn. Sometimes discursive instruction helps; 
sometimes other procedures are more effective. The more that critical skills are involved, 
the greater the role for critical discussion.  
Epistemological approaches to argumentation generally focus on belief, and that is 
proper since the cognitive transformations most relevant to argumentation do concern 
belief, but an important caveat is in order: for the purposes at hand, it is less important 
whether an argument effectively brings about a belief than whether it licenses that belief. 
(As Biro & Siegal 2006, p. 93 note, the sentences, “He succeeded in persuading by using 
a bad argument” and “He argued well, but unsuccessfully,” are not meaningless or self-
contradictory. There must be an objective component to argument evaluation.) 
More explanation is in order: One thing that an argument can do is persuade us 
that its thesis is acceptable or even convince us that its conclusion is true. Arguments can 
bring about the dramatic transformation from disbelief to belief. Lots of other things that 
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can do that, too, like direct experience, indirect socialization, mystic insights, and Evil 
Geniuses manipulating electrodes attached to our brains. What distinguishes beliefs 
brought about by good arguments is that they are justified and we are licensed to believe 
by those arguments. We are entitled to them. (See Pinto, forthcoming, especially part VI.) 
The key change is not whether I now believe p, whereas before I did not. I may have 
believed it all along, arguing about it precisely in order to test it. The difference is that 
after the argument I am entitled to that belief. In theory, it could be possible that this 
momentous epistemological change could occur while leaving my entire belief-set 
unchanged. Even so, this is no mere “Cambridge change.” 
Argumentation is not the only way that we can come to belief and it is not the 
only way to become entitled to a belief. There may surer, quicker, and more effective 
way to bring about belief but for many beliefs argumentation is the most rational way 
because entitlement comes with the belief. Argumentation is both a rational project and a 
joint endeavor. We show that we know this every time we insist that rhetoric is not about 
persuasion simpliciter and dialectics is not about winning at any cost – no more than 
proofs in logic are all about just reaching the conclusion any old way. Conclusions must 
be inferred validly. Made-up rules don’t count. Rhetorical success is persuasion that is 
brought about by rational means and dialectical success is consensus that is achieved by 
rational means. Accordingly, adequate theories of argumentation must be able to 
accommodate unequivocal normative principles and robust evaluations. Epistemological 
approaches have that much right. (See Lumer 2005a and 2005b for the roles of objectivity 
and normativity in epistemological approaches to argumentation.) But arguments are 
phenomena with broadly cognitive as well as narrowly epistemological import. Their 
roles in bringing about other cognitive transformations also need to be taken into account 
because they too count as argumentation’s successes.  
In addition to persuading and convincing, I think we can credit argumentation 
with the following cognitive achievements: 
 
• a deepened understanding of one’s own position; 
• the improvement of one’s position; 
• the abandonment of a standpoint for a better one – other than the opponent’s; 
• a deepened understanding of the opponent’s position; 
• a deepened appreciation of the opponent’s position; 
• acknowledgement of (the reasonableness of) another’s position; 
• greater attention to previously over-looked or under-valued details; 
• better grasp of connections and how things might be fit together in a big 
picture. 
 
And, notably, 
 
• entitlement to one’s own position. (This list is taken from Cohen 2007.) 
 
Each of these represents a cognitive advance. Only some of them can be explained in 
terms of the addition and subtraction of discreet beliefs; but all of them can result from 
argument. 
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We need to be careful here when we say these accomplishments “result from 
argument” because arguments effect changes in several different ways. Cognitive 
changes, including the narrowly epistemic, can be brought about by non-cognitive means. 
Only some of them are germane. Let me distinguish four ways that arguments bring about 
cognitive changes: 
First, in what many take as the archetypical case, arguments provide reasons. This 
is the domain of traditional epistemology and logic in the broad sense. It is the primary 
focus of much informal logic and critical thinking. Warrants, backing, and data become 
premises. The constituent assertions have logical consequences enabling them to serve as 
the reasons behind reasoned belief. Reference to reasons may suffice to explain the 
change of belief that occurs when we are convinced by an argument to accept its 
conclusion, but not when we decide to re-think and revise our own position after we have 
successfully defending it from criticism. 
Second, arguments can be causes. They are events in the lives of their 
participants, in their social, emotional, and psychological lives as well as their cognitive 
lives. For example, (as Gilbert 1997 makes clear) an argument might upset someone, 
thereby altering that person’s mood and outlook on the world. Some people have little 
tolerance for conflict and confrontation or simply just don’t like to argue (Gilbert 2005, p. 
28), so the mere occurrence of an argument can have a pronounced negative impact, with 
effects extending into the cognitive realm. “The world of the happy man,” Wittgenstein 
wrote, “is a different one from that of the unhappy man.” (Tractatus 6.43.) Conversely, 
since there are people who like to argue, an argument might be energizing and 
provocative. For some of us, arguing is stimulating. It motivates us to pay closer attention 
to what others say and to focus better on our own beliefs. These effects are positive and 
cognitive. 
Third, arguments can themselves be evidence. They are parts of our world. As a 
non-participating witness, I might be able to infer just from the fact that Alberta is 
arguing with Brandon that she opposes the proposal or that she dislikes him. Or, given 
other information, I might to infer that she is passionate about the subject matter and 
confident about her knowledge. I suppose I could even make these inferences about 
myself when I find myself arguing! After all, arguments largely consist of speech acts. 
They have pragmatic implications. One of the implications of an argument is that the 
thesis in question has been given some critical attention by the arguments’ participants. 
That is, the mere fact that someone has argued about something provides prima facie 
grounds for thinking she has some entitlement to that belief. Prima facie, but defeasible.   
Fourth (the most important, and a mixture of all of the above), arguments can be 
initiating catalysts, occasions, or conditions for other processes that eventuate in 
cognitive transformations. Many of the most important and specifically cognitive long-
term effects of arguments occur only after some time has elapsed. As I reflect later 
tonight on the arguments I will have had today, I will revisit my own standpoints, re-
examine my assumptions, rethink my conclusions, and perhaps come to revised or even 
completely new positions. I may also become more sensitive to and understanding of 
alternative standpoints. This delay might have no more significance than indicating how 
slowly I process new information. Or it could be a way of yielding to stronger arguments 
without losing face. Either way, the cognitive transformations that result may be deep and 
long lasting. They come about neither wholly as effects from causally efficacious events 
occurring in the argument, nor wholly as logical entailments from inferentially sufficient 
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grounds offered during the argument, nor wholly as pragmatic implications drawn from 
the argumentative acts. Arguments plant the seeds for ideas that come to fruition in the 
course of time. The most valuable cognitive transformations that grow out of 
argumentation do just that: they grow in an almost organic process. 
 
4. VIRTUOUS ARGUERS 
 
We are now in a better position to understand what it means to say that a good argument 
is one that has been conducted virtuously. We argue virtuously when we exhibit those 
acquired habits of mind that are conducive to one of argumentation’s characteristic 
cognitive achievements.  
It is important to notice both what this elegant little formula mentions and what it 
does not mention. It includes two variables, arguers and their achievements. It omits any 
mention of winning and losing, persuasion and resistance, or settlement, resolution and 
consensus.  
There are different roles for arguers to play in arguments. Defending a thesis is a 
different activity than criticizing a thesis, and both differ from weighing competing 
arguments. Each has its own skill-set. The art of rational persuasion is different from the 
art or resisting irrational persuasion. Adeptness at one does not guarantee adeptness at the 
other. Even an argument’s observers may have roles to play: it is one thing to listen to an 
argument as a member of a jury in order to render a judgment; it is quite another to 
observe a critical discussion with the hopes of learning something. Different virtues are 
required by the different roles, with different achievements likely. Learning something 
new, for example, is a more likely accomplishment of open-minded proponents than 
tenacious opponents; attentive observers are more likely to end up with a more refined 
understanding from a well-conducted argument between a passionate, engaged proponent 
and a clever opponent. And yet, tenacity, cleverness, and passionate engagement are all 
argumentative virtues right alongside open-mindedness and attentiveness. Perhaps what 
is really needed is a sense of proportion, as something of a meta-virtue, to keep them all 
in balance. 
As for the missing reference to outcomes: don’t winning and losing, persuasion 
and resistance, and consensus count for anything in evaluating an argument? It would 
appear not. There is no cognitive gain in winning per se. On the contrary, there is usually 
more cognitive gain in losing! We learn from losing, not winning. We can, however, 
recognize the cognitive achievements that do result from arguing as argumentative 
successes. An argument that successfully persuades an incompetent audience is 
successful only by that one measure. By itself, that does not tell us nearly enough for a 
useful judgment of the argument. That kind of success does not represent any kind of 
intellectual achievement. Nevertheless, it is relevant and cannot be put aside completely. 
When we ask whether the argument was conducted virtuously, instead of asking about 
persuasion or consensus, we are indirectly implicating both rational persuasion and 
rational consensus as possible cognitive achievements. Virtues do not always lead to 
cognitive achievements, but since virtues are identified as such by being conducive to 
those achievements, virtuous arguments will be more likely to bring them about. They 
serve in much the same way that rules work in rule utilitarianism: they do not invariably 
bring about the best result, but, once again, the final product is not the only factor to take 
into account. 
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